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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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FAR EAST

1. Comment on South Korean attitude toward forthcoming UN Korea debate:

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President Rhee's decision to send Prime Minister Pyun to head the South Korean delegation to the UN while that body considers the Korean question attests to his serious concern that a new conference on unification of Korea may be proposed. He fears the UN will press for unification of the peninsula through Korea-wide elections under supervision of a body including members from Communist or neutralist nations.

Following the Geneva conference, South Korea declared that it would not participate in additional international conferences on Korean unification, and challenged UN authority to deal further with the question.

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In support of Rhee, the South Korean National Assembly has passed a resolution that Korean unification must be accomplished by elections, in North Korea only, under UN supervision, and after withdrawal of Communist forces. The assembly holds that Korea-wide elections are contrary to the UN resolution of 1947 which established the Republic of Korea as the only lawful government in the country.

SOUTHEAST ASIA

2. Anti-French Vietnamese officers plot against Hinh:

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Young Vietnamese officers who command the loyalty of troops in Central Vietnam and have long opposed the pro-French Hinh

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faction in the army decided on 14 November to launch a revolt "at once" against the army command, [redacted]

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[redacted] re-
ports that most of the officers involved in the plot had been transferred from Central Vietnam by 15 November, and replaced by Hinh appointees. He doubts that an uprising will occur, but describes the situation as "extremely grave."

Comment: Hinh's announced intention to leave for France on 18 November will tend to forestall a revolt. In any case, French forces could quickly bring any revolt under control. The contrast between the military backgrounds of the senior Vietnamese officers, most of whom formerly served in the French army, and the younger officers who have risen entirely within the Vietnamese army is, however, a continuing source of discord which could reach serious proportions as French forces are gradually withdrawn.

SOUTH ASIA

3. Afghan religious leader denounces acceptance of Soviet aid:

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[redacted] The mullah of a large Kabul mosque recently publicly denounced Afghanistan's acceptance of Soviet aid and the increasing influence of the USSR in his country, according to the American embassy in Kabul. [redacted]

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[redacted] informed the embassy that this denunciation is part of a campaign, led by an influential group of mullahs, to force a reversal in the present Afghan policy toward the Soviet Union.

Comment: This denunciation might represent the opening note of protest from the strongly religious and conservative Islamic elements in Afghanistan who object to Soviet "godlessness" as well as to the modernization of their country.

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It could also be the first overt sign of dissatisfaction on the part of the elder members of the Afghan royal family with Prime Minister Daud's conduct of relations with the USSR. This group, the ultimate source of authority in the country, has on several occasions controlled Daud when his actions appeared to endanger national interests. Daud is married to King Zahir's sister.

NEAR EAST - AFRICA

4. Comment on Israel's foreign policy:

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Prime Minister Sharett's foreign policy speech in the Israeli parliament on 15 November strongly indicates that

Israel is increasingly uncompromising in its opposition to American policy in the Middle East.

Sharett devoted three quarters of his summary of Israel's foreign relations to the dangers posed for Israel by the Suez settlement, American arms for Iraq, and the possibility of arms for Egypt. Sharett reiterated the theme, persistently hammered at by Israeli spokesmen, that Israel was being weakened and isolated as the result of an American Middle East defense policy aimed, as Israel sees it, at building up the Arabs. He was also particularly critical of Egyptian interference with Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal.

Sharett's attack on Egypt, currently preoccupied with pressing problems of internal security, will tend to discourage the Nasr government from taking any steps toward reaching an Israeli-Egyptian agreement. [redacted]

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[redacted]


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6. Nationalist support of fellagha threatens crisis in Tunisia:

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The formal declaration of support for the Tunisian fellagha--quasi-military outlaws-- issued on 14 November by the principal nationalist party in Tunisia, the Neo-Destour, may invite French retaliation and dismissal of the Tunisian cabinet, in the opinion of the American consul general in Tunis. The consul general believes such action would be followed by general disorders.

The Neo-Destour national council demanded termination of the state of siege, return of Neo-Destour leaders from exile, and liberation of all political prisoners. The council also declared that the fellagha problem and political negotiations are inseparable.


Comment: The Neo-Destour declaration, following repeated French insistence that the Tunisian government publicly align itself with France's active anti-fellagha campaign, probably will interrupt, if not terminate, the negotiations for autonomy which have been under way in Paris since 13 September. Two Neo-Destour leaders are on the three-member Tunisian team negotiating for autonomy, and the party holds four of the ten Tunisian portfolios in the government.

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LATE ITEM

8. US embassy sees France willing to accept Viet Minh control of all Vietnam:

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Ambassador Dillon in Paris believes that Mendes-France, his personal advisers, and his government are favorably disposed toward the peaceful reunification of Vietnam

under Communist control. Dillon sees a pattern of forces taking shape in France similar in broad outline to the pre-Geneva situation and fears that the dilemma confronting the United States at that time may be posed again.

Dillon expects France to press more and more for American acceptance of the efforts of Jean Sainteny, French representative to North Vietnam, to reduce the dependence of Ho Chi Minh on Communist China. He does not feel that a continuation of American aid for the French expeditionary corps can do more than slow down the trend toward a policy of collaboration with the Viet Minh.



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Dillon thinks the French do not really believe that any South Vietnamese government can win any general election. Nonetheless, France, less and less willing to risk a resumption of the war, will insist on holding elections in 1956 as provided for in the Geneva settlement. Dillon adds that France does not consider the Manila pact an instrument that could be used in support of a policy of avoiding elections and of holding the 17th parallel against Viet Minh attempts at forceful reunification.